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Trust and confi dence:
Making the moral case for social work
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Abstract: Social work is often seen as a technical activity based on systems of specialist knowledge 
and evidence of ‘what works’, particular role expectations, regulatory frameworks and law. Although 
systems have no moral agency, individual encounters between social workers and service users are 
morally charged insofar as they impact directly on service users’ wellbeing. This paper argues that 
the ‘modernisation’ agenda in social care privileges confi dence in systems over trust in moral agents. 
Relying on confi dence neglects the role of trust and moral competence in human affairs and has 
signifi cant consequences for service users and the nature of social work.
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The moral nature of social work
My discussion is based on the premise that social work, and more broadly social care, 
are morally charged activities insofar as they are centrally concerned with the personal 
and social wellbeing of service users. I am not concerned here with contested issues 
regarding the relationship between an occupational group’s core purpose, its ethical 
code and its professional ‘status’ (see Banks 2004, Chapter 2, for a helpful discussion 
of these issues). However, I am concerned with differentiating social workers from 
other occupational groups on the basis of their motivation and the consequences of 
their interventions.
Social work intervention has a direct impact on the lives of people who are 
vulnerable and who need help for various reasons. Motivation that guides a worker 
towards morally good outcomes is necessary under conditions where much of what 
goes on between social workers and service users is hidden from direct surveillance 
and is free from immediate external control. This is also the case where such 
interaction is characterised, in at least some important respects, by ambiguity and 
uncertainty (Parton, 1998; White 1997; Stancombe and White, 1998). Similarly, 
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the consequences of social work intervention are morally loaded insofar as they can 
directly benefi t or harm the wellbeing of service users in a whole range of ways. 
Other occupational groups, for example plumbers, electricians, architects, bank 
employees are not centrally concerned with the moral wellbeing of their clients, 
although intentional malpractice, a lack of care or negligence may have secondary 
consequences in terms of clients’ self-esteem, independence, and emotional, social 
and physical wellbeing.
In emphasising moral motivation and consequences, it is not my intention to 
minimise the importance of systems such as technical knowledge, role expectations, 
regulations, procedures and law, as all contribute to the relationship between 
intervention and outcomes that enhances service users’ wellbeing. However, as 
Giddens (1990) points out, moral considerations are extrinsic to abstract systems. In 
modernity, such structured ways of knowing, thinking and acting are ‘disembedded’ 
from local contexts and personal relations, hence their durability across time and 
space. Importantly, systems cannot act and have no moral agency. Systems are 
designed to be functional and to achieve identifi ed ends - their internal effectiveness 
depends neither on the moral motivation of those who operate them, nor on the 
moral nature of their outcomes. Of course, moral agents may misuse systems or 
neglect system imperatives but these ‘faults’ cannot be attributed to the system. If 
a system fails to produce the ends for which it is designed, it can be modifi ed or 
extended to achieve greater effectiveness. This may happen, for example, through 
the development of more reliable knowledge to guide intervention, the introduction 
of procedural detail to direct action, the elaboration of rules to cover newly 
identifi ed contingencies and the extension of law to incorporate moral rights into 
a legal framework (Smith, 2002). While systems that inform or govern social work 
intervention are devoid of moral qualities, the engagement between social workers 
and service users that encourages emotional openness, invites trust, identifi es need 
and provides help and reassurance, is shot through with moral possibilities.
It is my contention that New Labour’s ‘modernisation’ policy in health (see 
Harrison and Smith, 2003; 2004) and social care (Smith 2001) has privileged 
the development of systems for providing safe, reliable, standardised services and 
predictable outcomes. This approach to service provision neglects issues associated 
with moral motivation and moral consequences which are central to service 
users’ experience of intervention and the expression of care. A reliance on system 
effectiveness readily accommodates the identifi cation of performance indicators, the 
measurement of performance against targets, audit and inspection arrangements 
and a range of prescriptive guidance about ‘what works’, based on a particular 
epistemological understanding of ‘scientifi c evidence’. Systems aim to introduce 
certainty and predictability into the management of human affairs and are designed to 
circumvent or overcome uncertainty and ambiguity. Hence the establishment of new 
institutions in the form of the Social Care Institute for Excellence, the Commission for 
Social Care Inspection (which will assume the National Care Standards Commission’s 
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regulatory and enforcement functions) and the General Social Care Councils. Between 
them, they will instruct, inspect, monitor and regulate the social care workforce and 
its activities. Additionally, systems have been introduced to measure performance 
against targets, including National Standards, annually published Social Services 
Performance Framework Indicators and summary star ratings that identify the best 
and worst performers.
Social workers are familiar with the legal framework that allows or requires 
intervention under prescribed circumstances and procedures that govern child 
protection (Department of Health, 1999). However, their work with service users has 
become increasingly regulated through offi cial instructions about what they should 
do, what information they should collect, how information should be recorded, what 
targets they should achieve and what time-scales they should meet (see for example, 
Department of Health, 1995; 2000; 2001). The drive towards greater transparency, 
accountability and cost-effectiveness in public services, which refl ect some 
characteristics of new public management (Pollitt, 1990), began to gather momentum 
in the 1980s. Under New Labour, however, it has assumed a focused momentum and 
a policy identity through the Government’s ‘determination’ to modernise health and 
social care (Department of Health 1998; para. 5). These developments have led some 
commentators to refer (somewhat loosely) to the ‘bureaucratisation’ of health and 
social care (Howe 1992; 1994; Blaugh 1995; Clarke 1996; Salter 2001). Here, they 
follow Max Weber’s (1947; 1970) characterisation of bureaucracy as incorporating 
hierarchically organised roles, disciplined and impartial application of rules and the 
focus of formal rationality on quantitative calculation and accounting. Modernisation 
is designed to establish confi dence that major decisions affecting human wellbeing can 
be ‘deliberate, systematic, calculable, impersonal, instrumental, exact, quantitative, 
rule-governed, predictable, methodical, sober, scrupulous, effi cacious, intelligible 
and consistent’ (Brubaker, 1984, p.2).
Morality and the role of trust
Moral motivation and moral consequences necessarily escape the capacity of abstract 
systems to identify their content, to require their performance or to calculate their 
effectiveness (see below for a consideration of ethical codes in this context). While 
confi dence characterises our attitude to abstract systems, trust characterises our 
attitude to social exchanges that rely on moral motivation and that have moral 
consequences. This requires an explanation of the conditions under which trust 
becomes a relevant concern and which enable it to fl ourish. Hollis (1998, p.1) 
says of trust that ‘although trust is an obvious fact of life, it is an exasperating one. 
Like the fl ight of the bumblebee or a cure for hiccoughs, it works in practice but 
not in theory’. In other words, we have an unproblematic (unrefl ective) grasp of 
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trust as it infl uences our everyday decisions and relationships, although it becomes 
more problematic to defi ne the difference between trust and related attitudes such 
as hope, belief, confi dence and faith. However, an investigation of trust indicates 
coherent features, which enable an understanding of the nature of trust and its role 
in mediating social affairs.
First, It is generally agreed that trust becomes relevant when social interaction is 
based on uncertain knowledge about the likely action of another and one depends 
on their response for a benefi cial outcome. This generates a ‘moral hazard’ that 
untrustworthy agents will act in such a way as to harm rather than to benefi t a 
trusting counterpart (Coleman, 1990; Lyons and Mehta, 1996; Williamson, 1993). 
Debates about trust frequently refer to Gambetta’s (1988, p.218) view that, in spite of 
complex defi nitional debates, we may identify convergence on a central characteristic 
of trust. This indicates that ‘the condition of ignorance or uncertainty about other 
people’s behaviour is central to the notion of trust’ such that an attitude of trust or 
distrust arises from an assessment about the likely consequences of engaging with 
others. Insofar as responses to our engagement become calculable or amenable to 
probabilistic outcomes (risk analysis) or are governed by abstract systems (regulatory 
frameworks, knowledge claims, role expectations and law), we come to depend less on 
trust and more on confi dence in functioning systems. Arrangements for accounting, 
audit and ensuring compliance reduce uncertainty and increase predictability. System 
effectiveness makes trust at best invisible and at worst redundant (Rose 1993; Power 
1994a, 1994b; Parton 1998). Fukuyama (1995, p.27) suggests that people who do not 
trust each other can only co-operate ‘under a system of formal rules and regulations, 
which have to be negotiated, agreed to, litigated and enforced, sometimes by coercive 
means’ and which serve as a ‘substitute for trust’.
Second, because trust operates outside formal regulatory frameworks, it must 
depend upon moral motivation. Thus, Baier suggests we cannot single-handedly 
safeguard things that are valuable to us, such as our health, emotional wellbeing, 
reputation, our dependants’ welfare and our signifi cant relationships. We therefore 
require help from others and in enlisting their help we make ourselves vulnerable 
to their opportunistic or careless behaviour in relation to the things we value. Thus, 
trusting constitutes a ‘reliance on others’ competence and willingness to look after, 
rather than harm, things one cares about which are entrusted to their care’ (Baier 1986, 
p.259). Trusting also allows others to use their discretion to respond benefi cially to 
our expectations and to care adequately for things we entrust to them. Jones develops 
Baier’s account by arguing that trusting behaviour requires:
An attitude of optimism that the goodwill and competence of another will extend to 
cover the domain of our interaction with her, together with the expectation that the 
one trusted will be directly and favourably moved by the thought that we are counting 
on her (1996, p.4).
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Importantly, Jones emphasises ‘moral competence’ as opposed to technical 
competence, where to trust anticipates kindness, care, generosity, compassion and 
sensitivity on the part of another. Optimism relates specifi cally to another’s actions 
and depends on ‘an affectively loaded way of seeing the one trusted’. Govier takes a 
similar view, suggesting that trusting incorporates an expectation of a benefi cial or 
neutral response even though it gives another the power to do us harm. In trusting 
another ‘we confi dently expect that he or she will do what is right for us - being 
competent to do so and being motivated in the right way’ (1993, p.157). These 
accounts emphasise affective and moral attitudes between those who act on trust 
and those who respond in a trustworthy way. This translates into a moral concern 
about the wellbeing of another and a morally motivated response to their trusting 
behaviour.
Although empirical research is limited, studies identify such variables as perceived 
openness, competence, fairness and care or altruism as infl uencing trusting attitudes 
to institutions/organisations (Petts, 1998; Johnson, 1999). Mechanic and Meyer’s 
(2000) research with patients having ongoing treatment or health monitoring, reports 
that they articulated trust in terms of ‘honesty, openness, responsiveness, having one’s 
best interests at heart, and willingness to be vulnerable without fear of being harmed’. 
They refer to Thom and Campbell’s (1997) study where participants identifi ed the 
kind of physician behaviour that promoted trust. Of seven categories, fi ve included 
interpersonal behaviour expressed as ‘understanding patients’ individual experiences, 
caring, communicating clearly and completely, building partnerships and honesty 
with respect for the patient’. Such studies suggest that when people refl ect on trust, 
they tend to identify qualitative interpersonal factors that point to the importance 
of moral and affective concerns. There is also evidence that social care users value 
attributes in social workers such as openness, warmth, honesty, sensitivity and a 
willingness and ability to offer caring relationships (Maluccio, 1981; Thoburn et al, 
1995; Bleach and Ryan, 1995; Smith et al, 1995; White, 1998).
Third, trust involves personal responsibility for making decisions under conditions 
of uncertainty. Luhmann (1988) refl ects this situation when he argues that ‘internal 
attribution’ is the response to trusting outcomes. When systems go wrong - the 
operation of law, the organisation of public transport, the delivery of social and 
health care - we can blame external others and events. However, when we decide 
that trust is warranted there is nobody but ourselves to blame if others let us down. 
This is why a violation of trust is thought to engender feelings of betrayal. That is, 
the trusting agent who is disappointed does not simply feel annoyed or irritated by 
untrustworthy behaviour. The elements of personal judgement, vulnerability and 
dependence on another’s actions, which are built into trust, indicate its moral nature 
and suggest that a sense of betrayal is appropriate to disappointed expectations. 
This is even more understandable if one relies on another’s goodwill and ‘moral 
competence’ in trusting relations.
Fourth, expressions of confi dent or trusting attitudes tend to depend on distinctive 
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sources of information and to refl ect different assessments. Deciding on confi dence 
relies on evidence that systems are well designed for their purpose, that they cover 
known eventualities, that they incorporate operational checks and that their outcomes 
are monitored and evaluated against their purpose. Deciding on trust, however, is a 
much more uncertain business. We tend to look for affective clues about potential 
trustworthiness including gestures, ‘body language’, facial expression, tone of voice 
and all those qualitative features of interaction that provide a sense of someone’s 
interest in us and concern about our wellbeing. Sometimes, there is little more to go 
on than ‘gut feeling’. Experience suggests that these distinctions are made in everyday 
life. For example, the system that ensures doctors or social workers are competent 
to practise (a regulated and quality assured programme of training, registration and 
periodic re-registration with a regulating body and arrangements for disciplinary 
action and de-registration) may promote confi dence. However, confi dence in a 
practitioner’s technical competence may be accompanied by a lack of trust in their 
moral competence, that is in their willingness and ability to practise with care, 
sensitivity, honesty and attentiveness to our particular needs.
Trust and confi dence: Distinctions and paradigms
Some commentators have begun to recognise a distinction between trust and 
confi dence, although this tends to be underdeveloped. For example, Lyons and 
Mehta (1996) suggest that technical and managerial abilities of trading partners 
do not constitute the ‘moral hazards’ of economic engagement. It is the behaviour 
(including motivation) of trading partners that must be factored into the equation 
of net gains resulting from a transaction. They therefore distinguish between ‘having 
confi dence in the abilities of a partner and having trust in their behaviour’ [original 
emphasis]. Luhmann (1988) argues that trust depends on action, which is chosen in 
the knowledge that a trusting agent must accept responsibility for disappointment. 
Confi dence refers to living with everyday dangers, where individuals routinely 
‘bracket’ life’s contingencies so that they can go about their business without a 
permanent sense of uncertainty. Here, confi dence must rely on ‘expert knowledge’ 
and social systems that control, predict or keep contingent events at bay. Tonkiss 
and Passey (1999) distinguish between social exchanges that depend on trust and 
moral commitment and those that require confi dence in ‘contract or other regulatory 
forms’ to secure co-operation.
Distinguishing trust and confi dence enables us to make sense of situations where 
we are unwilling to trust someone with apparently impeccable credentials. It points 
to an assessment that while someone is perfectly capable of doing a competent job, 
they may not be motivated to do it with care. They may instead be motivated by 
morally bad intentions or they may simply be careless about looking after things 
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that we value. This distinction also explains the contradiction to which O’Neill refers 
(2002, p.11) when noting the apparent decline of trust:
In short, reported public trust in science and even in medicine has faltered despite 
successes, despite increased efforts to respect persons and their rights, despite stronger 
regulation to protect the environment and despite the fact that environmental concerns 
are taken far more seriously than they were a few years ago. [Original emphasis]
O’Neill’s comments are unsurprising if we understand these developments as 
designed to improve confi dence rather than trust. It seems to me that two paradigms 
are in order here – one (trust) that centralises uncertainty, motivation and moral 
agency and the other (confi dence) that refers to predictability (risk), instrumentality 
and performance.
Improving the visibility of trust
I have argued that modernisation imperatives in health and social care emphasise 
the central role of systems for ensuring the competent performance of organisations 
and practitioners. This promotes confi dence. However, the moral nature of providing 
care, the signifi cance of motivation and uncertainty and the reported perceptions 
of service users suggest that confi dence is necessary, but not suffi cient, to meet 
service users’ needs. Additionally, trusting relationships may benefi t service users 
and constitute a moral good irrespective of any demonstrable association between 
intervention and outcomes. ‘What works’ does not necessarily constitute everything 
that service users and practitioners need and value. Encouraging the role of trust in 
social affairs requires action on several fronts.
First, Government must recognise that it cannot cure all the problems in the 
delivery of social care through policy imperatives that privilege confi dence over 
trust. Policy must be designed to promote an organisational and professional culture 
where trust can fl ourish
 Second, recruitment to programmes of social work education and training should 
not ignore or devalue candidates’ moral capacities. For example, Fox (1995, p.112) 
points to the kind of instrumental expectations that infl uence the recruitment of 
nursing candidates:
When a candidate at interview is asked why she chose nursing, the correct answer is 
no longer ‘I want to help people’. If that is what she actually feels it would be more 
prudent to talk about social obligations, nursing being a profession that involved relating 
to others, career mobility, academic and emotional gratifi cation … A nurse no longer 
has a vocation: she has a profession. She is no longer dedicated; she is a professional. 
She is no longer moral; she is accountable.
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Third, teaching and learning about social work must include attention to trust and 
its moral implications and this should be part of practitioners’ ongoing development. 
It might be argued that this area is already covered by Department of Health/GSCC 
and subject benchmark requirements for learning outcomes in ethics, the BASW 
(2002) Code of Ethics and the GSCC (2002) Codes of Practice. However, apart 
from observations that codes cannot include all contingencies, that they absolve 
individuals from personal responsibility and that they stunt moral refl ection and 
development (see for example: Dawson, 1994; Bauman, 1993, 1995; Banks, 2004, 
Ch. 4), I think they are properly understood as supporting confi dence rather than 
trust. Insofar as codes of ethics, particularly when they are transmuted into codes of 
practice or conduct, identify rules or ethical principles for guiding action, they do 
not refer to the kinds of motivation, uncertainty and moral capacity that characterise 
trust. Indeed, they are singularly unconcerned about motivation and they seek to 
achieve certainty in interpersonal encounters. Blum (1991) also argues that ethical 
principles are ineffective without reference to prior questions. These concern how 
individuals perceive the morally salient features of a situation, how they recognise 
the moral actions that such features require of them and how they understand the 
relevance of moral principles (ethical codes) in guiding their responses. Furthermore, 
principles or rules governing ethical conduct exclude the signifi cance of morally good 
qualities such as compassion, respect, kindness and sensitivity, which are valued by 
those who need health and social care.
There is a fourth reason why social work students, practitioners and employers 
should concern themselves with the relationship between moral motivation and 
trust, rather than concentrating only on adherence to codes of ethics and conduct. 
Stone (2002, p.63) suggests that ‘ethics, one might say, is what practitioners do 
when no one else is looking’. On the contrary, it seems more likely that ethics is 
what practitioners do when everyone else is looking. This mode of surveillance may 
be likened to the Panopticon - ‘permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous 
in its action’ (Foucault 1977, p.201). Codes of ethics and conduct provide the 
standards against which practice may be found wanting and constitute the basis for 
complaints, disciplinary action and possible litigation. Moral motivation and trust, 
by their very nature, cannot be codifi ed or regulated but are centrally implicated in 
the wellbeing of service users.
Finally, as Mechanic and Meyer (2000) note, it is possible to teach and learn about 
qualities, such as sensitive listening, responsiveness and a demeanour that conveys 
care and understanding, which are fundamental to acting on trust.
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Conclusion: Giving trust a necessary role
I am often asked to elaborate on the disadvantages of ‘returning’ to a dependence on 
trust, rather than continuing to improve confi dence in the delivery of health and social 
care. Critics of trust argue that modernisation imperatives are, after all, designed to 
improve on a well-known history of poor performance, scandals, ‘adverse events’, 
delay and organisational malaise, which are damaging for service users. This, however, 
is not the appropriate question. Trust and confi dence refer to distinctive aspects of 
experience and service provision. They represent two paradigms, which by their 
nature are incommensurable. Service users appreciate having confi dence in reliable 
service delivery, in systems that ensure safe and effective care and in the technical 
competence of a regulated and accountable workforce. However, service users also 
value practitioners who can be trusted to respect them and to respond morally well 
to their vulnerability and who will be motivated to work with care, sensitivity and 
kindness. Both trust and confi dence are necessary to recognise and respond to the 
needs of service users for effective performance and for moral competence. The danger 
to our willingness and ability to achieve morally competent social work practice lies 
in either thinking that measures to improve confi dence will also support trust or in 
concluding that trust has no role to play at all.
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